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Abstract 
Numerous academic studies point out the detrimental effects of large acquisitions on 
the performance of acquirers, often concluding that companies rarely recognize the 
revenue and cost synergies that they hope to attain with an acquisition. Concurrently, 
a number of finance professionals propose that investment bankers tend to maintain 
extreme optimism about the value of acquisitions. Thus, in study I ask the following 
research question: Are individuals with work experience in investment banking more 
likely to participate in M&A activity than their non-banking peers? Specifically, I test 
whether the executives (specifically CFOs) of publicly traded technology companies 
with investment banking work experience are more likely to make acquisitions than 
their peers who have never worked in transaction advisory. I predict that CFOs with 
backgrounds in investment banking are more likely to participate in M&A activity 
due to the confidence they possess in their ability to realize merger synergies. I find 
evidence indicating that firms with CFOs with work experience in the investment 
banking industry make more acquisitions than firms that have CFOs with no 
investment banking work experience. That is, CFOs with investment banking work 
experience make twice as many acquisitions as firms that have CFOs with no 
investment banking experience. 
 
**I would like to thank my thesis advisor, Sam Melessa, Ph.D., for his assistance throughout 
this project. Additionally, I would like to thank Jon Garfinkel, Ph.D., Jue Wang, and Alanson 
Tobias for their support in my data retrieval and analysis. 
1. Introduction 
In this study, I ask the following research question: “Do former investment 
bankers make more acquisitive CFOs than their counterparts that do not have 
investment banking work experience?” I hypothesize that former investment bankers 
make more acquisitions than their counterparts due to their reputation as overly 
optimistic acquirers. 
1.1 Research Question and Motivation 
This study is motivated by the combination of two ideas: (1) that investment 
bankers tend to encourage company executives to pursue acquisitions that do not 
reflect their employer’s long-term interests and (2) that most M&A deals destroy 
shareholder value and hurt long-term company performance. Corporate executives 
rely on investment bankers to act as external advisors who provide objective advice to 
their clients, but because investment bankers are compensated upon the completion of 
a transaction, some argue that deal advisors are incentivized to convince acquirers to 
take part in M&A activities that have the highest likelihood of completion. This 
compensation structure can also incentivize investment bankers to rush the transaction 
process, which can lead to ignorance regarding the negative attributes of a potential 
acquisition.2 Simultaneously, academics have published a wealth of research 
suggesting that acquisitions often fail to meet the financial expectations of the 
acquirer and can have a negative impact on the company’s value. This typically 
happens because of one of three reasons: (1) the acquirer and investment bank 
misgauge strategic fit, (2) the acquirer is unable to take advantage of revenue and cost 
synergies that it hopes to gain through the acquisition, or (3) the acquirer overpays for 
the target company.3 For these reasons, public companies typically trade at a price 
discount after announcing a large merger or acquisition.5 In combination, these 
opinions, research, and documented market reactions led me to examine the 
propensity of executives with investment banking backgrounds to make acquisitions 
relative to their peers. This research may help investors evaluate management teams, 
understand executive decision-making, and better predict which companies are most 
likely to partake in mergers, acquisitions, or other activities that put a company’s 
financial health at risk. 
1.2 Background and Related Research 
1.2.1 Impact of Acquisitions on Acquirers 
A significant amount of literature examines the post-merger performance of 
acquiring companies. In 1991, Franks, Harris, and Titman released a paper that 
highlights some of the earliest research on the topic. The researchers examined 399 
acquisitions made by NYSE and AMEX firms over a ten year period. Using an 
equally-weighted index of sample companies, the scholars’ findings confirm former 
research which claims that companies experience poor post-merger performance. 
Franks, Harris and Titman claim that under different measures (a non-equally-
weighted index), though, the study’s sample acquirers experience no statistically 
significant abnormal performance in the post-merger period.4 
Scholars continue to debate the efficacy of corporate acquisitions, but 
Agrawal, Jaffe, and Mandelker attempt to clarify the divided literature on the topic by 
conducting a study with a more exhaustive sample of mergers than previously 
considered. Agrawal, Jaffe, and Mandelker find that acquirers, on average, suffer a 
10% decrease in stock price in the 5-year post-merger period.1 
1.2.2 Investment Banker Optimism 
Very little academic research exists that focuses on investment banking 
professionals’ confidence in the ability of companies to effectively execute large 
mergers or acquisitions. Anecdotally, I find that investment bankers have a reputation 
for over-optimism in the value that M&A transactions provide to acquirers. Because 
investment bankers are compensated with deal fees, many professionals assume that 
investment bankers are likely to seek acquisitions with quick processes and high-
likelihood of completion. If this assumption is true, it’s feasible to believe that 
investment bankers spend a significant amount of time highlighting the positive and 
ignoring the negative attributes of target firms, further fueling their willingness to 
conduct M&A activity. 
1.2.3 Assumptions and Research Impact 
The validity of my hypothesis rests on the assumption that the results of 
Agrawal, Jaffe, and Mandelker are more representative than the results of Franks, 
Harris, and Titman. My research is more relevant to investors if acquisitions 
negatively affect shareholder value than if they positively affect shareholder value. 
If one assumes that acquisitions are typically destructive to shareholder value, 
and CFOs with investment banking experience make acquisitions more frequently 
than their counterparts (per my hypothesis), then it is possible that CFOs with 
investment banking experience make more acquisitions during their tenure at a 
company, negatively impacting long-term shareholder value. 
2. Data and Research Design 
2.1 Sample Selection 
To test my hypothesis, I use a sample consisting of companies with 
membership in the Russell 3000 Index between November of 2012 and November of 
2017. The data considers only companies in the technology sector and acquisitions 
that happened between November of 2012 and November of 2017. In this dataset, I 
exclude a single outlier that skews the results of the data. Observations with missing 
data are also removed. The resulting dataset consists of 39 observations. 
2.2 Data Collection 
I use several different data sources to collect all of the information needed to 
construct my sample, including Thomson Reuters SDC Platinum, FRED Economic 
Data from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, company websites, and LinkedIn.  
First, I gather the acquisitions made by Russell 3000 companies since 1994, 
including the effective date, the acquirer, the target company, and the deal value. I 
proceed to cut the data to only include companies that were a part of the Russell 3000 
from November of 2012 to November of 2017. After narrowing the list of acquirers to 
a random sample of 40, I collect each of their acquisitions that occurred from 
November of 2012 to November of 2017. I eliminate one of the companies due to its 
outlier status, which heavily influenced the statistics of the dataset. 
After finalizing my sample companies and acquisitions, I use LinkedIn and 
manually pull the names and work history of each CFO from the 39 companies in my 
sample. I then link the CFOs to the number of acquisitions their company made 
during the aforementioned 5-year period. From that point, I determine if the CFO’s 
company made above the median number of acquisitions for the data set or below the 
median number of acquisitions for the data set. Table 1 shows a breakdown of data 
for all 39 of my observations. 
The information in the dataset may be influenced by the many large acquirers 
that employ executives with investment banking backgrounds.  This research assumes 
that each sample company’s current CFO held their current role from November of 
2012 to November of 2017. 
2.3 Variables of Interest 
2.3.1 Dependent Variable 
 My dependent variable is the number of acquisitions a company made in the 5-
year period starting in November of 2012 and ending in November of 2017. From my 
sample of 39 firms, I was able to gather data on 92 acquisitions. 
2.3.2 Independent Variable 
My independent variable is a dummy variable that indicates whether a CFO 
has investment banking work experience. If the CFO does have investment banking 
work experience, the variable equals one. If the CFO does not have investment 
banking work experience, the variable equals zero. For the sample of 39 firms, eight 
firms had a CFO with investment banking work experience, while the remaining 31 
companies had CFOs with no investment banking work experience. 
 
 
2.4 Empirical Methods 
 To test my research question, I estimate the following linear equation using 
ordinary least squares: 
Dependent Variable = β0 +   β1*X Variable 
The dependent variable in the formula refers to the number of acquisitions a 
company makes in the 5-year period starting in November of 2012 and ending in 
November of 2017, while the independent variable (X Variable) refers to whether or 
not a CFO has investment banking work experience.  
3. Results 
Table 2 displays the regression results. The results in this table are estimated 
using the entire dataset excluding a single outlier. The independent variable, whether 
or not a CFO has investment banking work experience, has a positive coefficient, 
supporting the idea that CFOs with investment banking work experience make more 
acquisitions than their counterparts without investment banking work experience. The 
regression results demonstrate an increase in M&A activity for CFOs with investment 
banking work experience. Specifically, if a company’s CFO has investment banking 
work experience, the company makes on average 3.75 acquisitions over the five-year 
period (1.879 + 1.871 = 3.75). The p-value on the coefficient of interest is less than 
five percent and indicates that this results is statistically significant. This represents 
double the amount of acquisitions made by firms with CFO with no investment 
banking experience (1.871). Overall, this result supports my hypothesis that former 
investment bankers would have increased optimism in their ability to recognize 
synergies in a merger and therefore participate in more acquisitions than CFOs 
without investment banking experience. 
The dataset’s Adjusted R Square is 0.114060937, which implies that 11.40% 
of the variation in the number of acquisitions made by firms can be explained by 
whether their CFO has worked in the investment banking industry.  
Tables 3 and 4 display the distribution of CFO by the number of acquisitions 
to illustrate the connection between a company CFO’s experience in investment 
banking and the number of acquisitions made by his/her employer. Table 3 
communicates the number of acquisitions made by CFOs without investment banking 
work experience. Table 4 reports the number of acquisitions made by CFOs with 
investment banking work experience. 
4. Next Steps 
After a careful analysis of the limited data I used for this project, I conclude 
that the topic is worthy of further study by academic researchers. 
My analysis could be extended to include a larger sample size, as expanding 
the sample would allow for stronger and more generalizable results. I believe the 
improved sample should also include the remaining business sectors as classified by 
Standard & Poor’s, as technology companies are often run by executives with 
engineering backgrounds which makes the development of a data difficult considering 
the sample requires a significant number of CFOs with investment banking work 
experience. The entire business sector list should include companies in the 
information technology, consumer discretionary, consumer staples, energy, financials, 
health care, industrials, materials, telecommunications, and utilities sectors. 
Any new research on the topic should control for firm size, industry, and changes 
in CFOs over the 5-year period used to analyze M&A activity. 
If a similar study with an improved sample provides the same results as my study, 
continued research could attempt to determine whether CFOs with investment 
banking work experience make more effective acquisitions, which could speak to the 
idea that CFOs with investment banking work experience are value destructive to 
shareholders due to their acquisitive nature. The effectiveness of acquisitions can be 
measured by a number of variables, including: 
 Short-Term Stock Price Fluctuations 
 Long-Term Stock Price Fluctuations 
 Goodwill Impairments Resulting from Over-Priced Acquisitions 
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Table 1 
CFO Work Experience and Acquisition Data 
 CFOs w/  
Investment Banking 
Experience 
CFOs w/o 
Investment Banking 
Experience 
All CFOs 
CFOs Observed 
 
8.00 31.00 39.00 
Total Acquisitions 
 
30.00 58.00 88.00 
Median Acquisitions 
 
3.00 2.00 2.00 
Average 
Acquisitions 
3.75 1.87 2.26 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Regression Statistics
Multiple R 0.370641502
R Square 0.137375123
Adjusted R Square 0.114060937
Standard Error 1.952018158
Observations 39
Coefficients t Stat P-value
Intercept 1.870967742 5.336583306 4.96649E-06
X Variable 1 1.879032258 2.427414375 0.020192031
ANOVA
df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 1 22.45202647 22.45202647 5.892340547 0.020192031
Residual 37 140.983871 3.810374891
Total 38 163.4358974
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0%
Intercept 1.870967742 0.350592811 5.336583306 4.96649E-06 1.160599231 2.581336253 1.160599231 2.581336253
X Variable 1 1.879032258 0.774087967 2.427414375 0.020192031 0.310581054 3.447483462 0.310581054 3.447483462
Table 2 
Regression Analysis (Number of Acquisitions / Investment Banking Work 
Experience 
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Table 3 
Normal Distribution of the Executives without Investment Banking Experience 
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Table 4 
Normal Distribution of the Executives with Investment Banking Experience 
 
